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NOTES
BILLS AND NOTES: FICTITIOUS PAYEES UNDER THE AMENDED N. I. L.-In a
recent Missouri decision, Prugh, Combest & Land, Inc. v. Linwood State Bank,' a
typical fictitious payee situation was litigated, but because Missouri has an amended
version of section 9-3 of the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law, 2 an exactly opposite
result was reached than would have been reached under the unamended N. I. L. Since
California 3 and nine other states besides Missouri have a similar amendment, 4 an
analysis of the effect of this amendment is in order. The facts of the Prugh Co. case
will be helpful in illustrating the law of fictitious payees as it stands both before and
after the amendment.
It was part of the policy of the Prugh Co., a security investment firm, to arrange
loans for its customers through the Linwood State Bank. When requested to arrange
a loan, Prugh Co. would have its customer sign a promissory note payable to Linwood
Bank and list thereon the stocks to be pledged as security for the loan. After the
Linwood Bank had approved the loan, it would credit Prugh's account with the amount
of the loan and Prugh would then issue its check drawn on Linwood Bank to the
customer for the amount of the loan. It was this business arrangement which formed
the basis for the fraudulent scheme which resulted in the litigation. One Ryan, an
impecunious security salesman for Prugh Co., went to the office of the secretarytreasurer of Prugh Co. and falsely represented that one of their customers, with whom
Ryan had had previous dealings, was desirous of negotiating a loan for $3,200 and
that he wished to pledge his stocks, then on deposit with Prugh Co. for safekeeping,
as security for the loan. Knowing that this customer had ample stock with which to
secure such a loan, the secretary-treasurer gave Ryan an undated note made payable
to the Linwood Bank. Ryan filled out the note, forged the customer's name as maker
and took the note along with the stock certificates to the Linwood Bank where the
loan was arranged. Ryan then returned to his office with the $3,200 credit to Prugh's
account and presented it to the secretary-treasurer. The secretary-treasurer then made
out a check drawn on Linwood Bank made payable to the customer, signed it in the
name of Prugh Co. and handed it to Ryan who said he would mail it to the customer
with a personal letter. Instead, Ryan indorsed the customer's name, took the check
to his own bank, the South Side Bank, and deposited the check to his own account.
The South Side Bank indorsed the check, "Prior Indorsements Guaranteed," and sent
it on to the drawee Linwood Bank where it was paid and charged to the account of
Prugh Co. Ryan repeated this whole process with the name and stocks of another
customer for a loan of $1,750.
Under the original section of the N. I. L. the result would be that Linwood
Bank would sustain the loss created by Ryan's fraud. The original section 9-3
provides: "The instrument is payable to bearer when it is payable to the order
of a fictitious or non-existing person, and such fact was known to the person
making it so payable." That section is but a codification of the English common
law position. 5 It has been a prolific source of litigation because the section does not
'241 S. W. 2d 83 (Mo., 1951).
'Mo. Rev. Stat. Ann. 3025 (3), R. S. 1949, 401.009 (3).
'Cal. Civ. Code, see. 3090 (3), as amended (1945).
'Louisiana: Dart's Gen. Stats. Supp. (1942), § 798; Massachusetts: G. L. Ter. Ed., c. 107,
§ 31; Georgia: Ga. Code Ann., § 14-209; New Mexico: 1941 Comp., § 53-109; North Carolina:
1949 G. S., § 25-15; Oregon: 1949 0. C. L. A., § 69-109; Montana: Rev. Codes Ann. (1947), 55-209
(3) ; Idaho: Idaho Code, 27-109; Illinois: Ill Rev. Stats. (1949), c. 98, § 29 (3).
'The leading English case presenting the common law position is Minet v. Gibson, 3 T. R. 482,
100 Eng. Rep. 689 (1789).
(58)
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mean literally what it says. For a payee to be fictitious within the meaning of the
section, he does not have to be nonexistent. Conversely, a nonexistent payee is not
necessarily fictitious within the meaning of the section. The key to the whole riddle
is the intention of the party who gives life to the instrument by validating it with his
signature. If the person who signs it intends that the named payee have no beneficial
interest in the instrument, then the payee is fictitious and it is bearer paper (or a
bearer is authorized to indorse the fictitious payee's name). On the other hand, if
the party signing it intends that the named payee get the beneficial interest in the
instrument, then that payee is nonfictitious and consequently it is order paper, and
that is so whether that payee exists in the flesh or not. Thus it can be seen that the
fictitiousness of the payee depends not on the existence or nonexistence of the payee
in the lay sense, but rather on the intention of the person whose signature gives life
to the instrument. The very simplest example of a fictitious payee is the common case
of a check made out to "Cash." 6 Clearly that is a bearer instrument, not because there
is no payee in existence by that name, but because the drawer of the check does not
intend that anyone by the name of "Cash" get a beneficial interest in the check. The
Prugh case represents the other extreme in complexity. In applying these principles to
the Prugh case it is readily seen that it cannot be the intent of Ryan that controls
because lie did not sign the checks and had no authority to sign checks. So it is
the intent of the secretary-treasurer that controls despite the fact that it was Ryan
who instigated and carried out the entire deception. What then was the intent of
the secretary-treasurer? Clearly he thought a valid loan was being made and so he
intended that the named payee get the full beneficial interest in the checks. Therefore,
the payee would not be fictitious and the checks would be order instruments under
the unamended N. I. L. 9-3. It is important to determine whether the instruments are
order or bearer paper because if they are bearer paper no indorsement is necessary
to pass title in the checks. Then Ryan's forgeries, if they were forgeries, could be
treated as surplusage so that Linwood Bank could rightfully debit Prugh's account.
On the other hand, if the checks were order instruments an indorsement would be
necessary to the passage of title, and so Ryan and South Side Bank were never holders
and consequently were in unlawful possession of the checks. Therefore, the drawee
Linwood Bank would have no right to debit Prugh's account when the checks were
presented for collection. So under the unamended N. I. L. these checks would have
been order instruments, Ryan's indorsements would have been forgeries, no title would
ever have passed and Linwood Bank could not legally debit Prugh's account so that
they would have to sustain the loss. There are many cases under the unamended
N. I. L. where the drawee bank took the loss merely because the fraudulent employee
had no authority to sign cheeks. 7 However, the drawee bank does have a recovery
against the collecting bank, the South Side Bank in this case, either in quasi contract
for money paid out by mistake,8 or on the written guaranty of prior indorsements

'Bascal v. Nat. City Bank, 262 N. Y. S. 839, 146 Misc. 732 (1933).

7Edgington v. Security First Nat. Bank, 78 Cal. App. 2d 849, 179 P. 2d 64 (1947) ; Security
First Nat. Bank of Los Angeles v. Bank of America Nat. Trust & Savings Assn., 22 Cal. 2d 154,
137 P. 2d 452 (1943) ; Robertson Bank Co. v. Brasfield, 202 Ala. 167, 79 So. 651 (1918) ; Commonwealth v. Farmers' Deposit Bank of Frankfort, 264 Ky. 839, 95 S.W. 2d 793 (1936) ; Metropolitan
Casualty Ind. Co. v. First Nat. Bank of Detroit, 261 Mich. 450, 246 N. W. 178 (1933) ; Republic
Nat. Bank of Dallas v. Maryland Cas. Co., 184 S.W. 2d (1944).
'Wellington Nat. Bank v. Robbins, 71 Kan. 743, 81 Pac. 487 (1905) ; Corn Exchange Bank v.
Nassau Bank, 91 N. Y. 74, 43 Am. Rep. 655 (1883); First Nat. Bank of Minneapolis v. City Nat.
Bank of Holyoke, 182 Mass. 130, 65 N. E. 24 (1902).

